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| Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium | 
 enlarge | Authors: Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, Leslie Young
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $45.00
Buy Used: $9.85
You Save: $35.15 (78%)
New (6) Used (14) from $9.85
Avg. Customer Rating:  2 reviews
Sales Rank: 1872163
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 458
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.3
Dimensions (in): 9 x 5.8 x 0.9
ISBN: 0521377005
Dewey Decimal Number: 382.70973
EAN: 9780521377003
ASIN: 0521377005
Publication Date: August 25, 1989
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
This book provides a special interest theory of protection, developing a full general equilibrium theory that explains the distribution of income with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties, and voters all pursuing their self interest. This probabilistic voting model shows how well-organized groups can use seemingly irrational government policies to exploit poorly organized groups. Given rational predatory behavior between these groups, protection or any other redistributive policy that improves the chances of election of a party increases political efficiency. This can create an economic black hole, conditions under which an entire economy can disappear into lobbying. Paradoxically, the tariff rates accompanying an economic black hole are very low. The economic waste is confined to lobbying costs. The book contains both theoretical and empirical work explaining protection in the United States (1900-1988) and levels of protection in about sixty foreign countries in the 1980s.
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| Customer Reviews:
 The most formally sophisticated model of its kind August 14, 2008
This is a fine book, easily the most formally sophisticated model of its kind. The idea is to formalize political economy, getting beyond stale ideological discussions, and instead plop down an entire political subsystem in the middle of a standard (if simplistic) general equilibrium economic model. Groups allocate resources between economic and political activity; parties position themselves to gather financial support as well as votes. The economic and political consequences of their mutual decisions play out in a minimax general equilibrium fashion. Repays detailed study.
 loved it June 7, 2000
0 out of 2 found this review helpful
I never would have been able to understand this kind of technology if i didn't read the book!
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